Wyoming Law Journal
Volume 12

Number 2

Article 3

December 2019

The Federal Rules: Control of the Human Equation through PreTrial
Irving R. Kaufman

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlj

Recommended Citation
Irving R. Kaufman, The Federal Rules: Control of the Human Equation through Pre-Trial, 12 WYO. L.J. 92
(1958)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlj/vol12/iss2/3

This Special Section is brought to you for free and open access by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Wyoming Law Journal by an authorized editor of Law Archive of Wyoming
Scholarship.

THE FEDERAL RULES: CONTROL OF THE HUMAN EQUATION
THROUGH PRE-TRIAL
IRVING

R.

KAUFMAN*

I am grateful to the Wyoming Bar for the kind invitation extended to
me by your able and gracious President, Mr. Steadman, to address you
today. He has informed me that your fine state has recently adopted new
rules of civil procedure modeled along the lines of the federal rules.
Wyoming thus becomes the 20th state to adopt the federal rules in whole
or with certain minor modifications. This is an extremely impressive
testimonial to their exceptional utility as tools in furthering the ends of
effective, efficient and expeditious justice and you are to be congratulated
upon their adoption.
As one jurist commented in discussing the truly remarkable reception
accorded the federal rules,
"A new procedure must be oustanding to be cherished so soon by
the legal profession, which in the past has had the reputation of
of being unwilling to follow new paths and which was said to cling
to the legal maze with gross persistence."
(Holtzoff, A Judge Looks At The Rules After Fifteen Years of
Use).
The reasons behind this well-nigh universal acclaim are not mysterious.
They mark a realization that technical forms are unimportant; that procedural rules are merely a means to an end and that the ultimate objective
must be to do justice. The rules are characterized by a desire to reduce
technicalities to a minimum and to decide all cases on their merits as
expeditiously as possible.
How well the rules have succeeded in translating these broad objectives
into concrete precepts may be demonstrated by a bare enumeration of a
very few of them.
The abolition of procedural differences between law and equity alone
obviated a great deal of pedantic disputation. It made it unnecessary for
counsel to make the delicate decision of whether to file suit at law or in
equity. His client now obtains whatever relief the proof shows he should
receive.
One of the most far-reaching changes was in the area of pleadings.
Not only were the number of pleadings sharply curtailed, but the abundance of technical requirements that had encrusted themselves upon the
pleadings were abolished by the introduction of averments in general
terms. No longer are technical deficiencies in pleadings grounds for
dismissal.
*United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York.
received his LL.B. from Fordham University in 1932.
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The principles governing joinder of parties and claims, and third
party practice provide other important innovations. They are designed to
permit the disposal of as many controversies as is reasonably possible at
one time.
Perhaps the most notable advance and in a sense the very "guts"
of the federal rules, are the liberal discovery provisions. Without them
it would have been impossible to simplify pleadings and to reduce technicalities. They were designed to convert the lawsuit from a sporting
event into a search for truth and justice and in this they have laregly
succeeded.
The basic objectives of the rules, as succinctly summarized in the first
rule, are "to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action." Candor compels me to state, however, that these objectives
have not been invariably attained. No matter what rules are adopted, the
human equation remains. And it is this factor which I should like to
discuss with you today.
The rules will not provide a panacea for all of your procedural ills
for like all human institutions, they are subject to abuse. It is important
to remember at the outset that these rules are no more than tools. They
represent, in a sense, a great technological advance, but they do not guarantee that justice will naturally ensue. It all depends on what use these
tools are put to. Like the ordinary hammer, they are designed and molded
for constructive purposes, but like a hammer, they may be used to beat
someone unmercifully over the head.
Thus, even after almost 19 years of experience with these rules in the
federal courts, there are still a few attorneys who, unfortunately, insist on
interpreting freedom from picayune restriction as license for harassment.
Judge Medina had occasion in a recent decision to refer to this use of
"artful maneuvers and procedural sallies which serve little purpose other
than to throw sand in the judicial machinery and to induce payments for
what is euphemistically called 'nuisance value.'" (General Houses, Inc. v.
Marloch Mfg. Corp., Dec. 26, 1956). The only effect of the federal rules
on these fellows is that whereas before, their motion maneuvers were
directed toward pleadings, they are now by-and-large transferred to discovery.
Unfortunately, largely as a result of the activities of these very few
attorneys, there has been a certain amount of sporadic sniping at the
discovery rules. A compilation of these criticisms was made a few years
back and it certainly reads like a parade of horrors.
"It is said: (1) That discovery is expensive and time consuming
out of proportion to benefits; that depositions last weeks, interrogatories and admissions cover thousands of items, and motions
to produce call for tons of documents. (2) That discovery is used
to pry into private affairs not relevant and material to the litiga-
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tion. (3) That dilatory discovery motions take up the judges' time
and delay disposition. (4) That expensive, dilatory, and embarrassing discovery is deliberately used to harrass the other side into
favorable settlement. (5) That attorneys race to be first with
discovery to tie up the other side and saddle it with expense, defendants usually having an unwarranted priority. (6) That in
practice, relief is unobtainable from judges because at th discovery stage they cannot investigate either the issues or the evidence thoroughly enough to rule effectively; judges tend to say,
'answer the questions and don't bother me with these details.'
(7) That non-reviewable rulings on discovery are not uniform
among courts, or among different judges on the same court; that
even the same judge at different times fails to give consistent
rulings; so that wrangling over discovery is encouraged. (8) That
suits are tried by deposition or other discovered materials without
the prophylactic influence of observing the witness under crossexamination. (9) That perjury is promoted both by furnishing
the information with which an unscrupulous party can fabricate a
convincing story and by reducing the opportunity to surprise the
perjurer with contradictory evidence. And (10) that lawyers use
discovery to take advantage of the trial preparations of the other
side so that careful investigation is unrewarded and intra-organization reports cannot be frank."
(William H. Speck-The Use of Discovery in United States District Courts-60 Yale L.J. 1132 (1951).
It is important that these criticisms be placed in their proper perspective. They certainly do not represent a majority view. In fact, they
constitute no more than a few still voices in the wilderness when contrasted with the general acclaim accorded the discovery provisions and,
more important, their universal utilization. No one doubts, however, that
there have been isolated instances, even when the attorneys were acting in
the utmost good faith, where the operation of the discovery rules would
justify each one of these criticisms.
These abuses have been particularly prevalent in the so-called "big
cases"-the large anti-trust actions. In one such case, that of Ferguson v.
Ford Motor Co., tried and ultimately settled in the Southern District of
New York, the cost of the stenographic transcript of the depositions alone
amounted to something in the neighborhood of half a million dollars.
And that figure does not include any provision for the cost of microfilming,
the cost of making photostats, the cost of printing, travel expenses, and,
of course, it includes nothing at all for the charges of the multitude of
counsel engaged.
What makes these astronomical expenses even more appalling is the
fact that in so many of these cases the percentage of useful information
uncovered is so minute. The best estimates are that less than 10% of all
the material contained in these voluminous depositions is useful at the
trial. And searching for that 107 can be quite a headache.
Last year, in discussing his experiences with the Investment Bankers
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case before a bar association meeting on pre-trial, Judge Medina in his
usual able and delightful way spoke to the point by recounting the following incident:
"Have you any idea of how horrible it is in this Federal system
of ours to have these depositions taken . . ., thousands and thousands and thousands of pages of irrelevant questions, and this and
that and the other thing, until the judge at the trial who hears
those depositions read, cannot make head or tail of what is going
on ....
In that Investment Bankers case I said, 'Boys, if you are
going to have any depositions, I am going to sit. I don't want to do
it. I have plenty else to do, but I think I had better set a pattern,
so that you know how to follow,' and I did sit for the first deposition, and put some control over it, and then I got into the Communist case and I had to quit, and all the rest of the depositions
had to go on for the next year or so without by being there, and
what a mess. What a messl They came in there; a fellow would
say 'Were you in Chicago on the 1st of June, 1938?' He would
say 'That House of J. P. Morgan are the biggest crooks I ever hear
of' and he would go on for two or three pages, you know. Nobody
could stop him. It was in one of these law offices taking a deposition, and they would ask another question, and blah, blah, blah,
and that would go on ad infinitum, and I was supposed to find out
what they were talking about."
It is little wonder that the attorneys in these protracted cases occasionally discuss such discovery proceedings in terms of cruel and unusual
punishment.
Now the last thing I want to do is to give anyone here the impression
that I believe the enlightened discovery provisions should not be retained.
We don't want to do away with airplanes because occasionally there are
accidents. It is important, however, to realize the possible pitfalls, the need
for a proper and intelligent approach by the courts and by the bar, the
need for skillful utilization of the discovery provisions and the need for
some curbs on their misuse.
Discovery has enabled thousands of parties to establish their legal
rights which, without discovery, would have been denied them. It has
facilitated the proof of substantive rights by making the evidence equally
available to all parties. Almost every attorney now agrees that the advantages in obtaining a discovery of the adversary's case fully compensate
for what may be regarded as the premature disclosure of one's own case.
And it is not a question of the lazy lawyer profiting by the investigation of
the other side. It has been the conscientious and industrious lawyer who
has been resorting to discovery to try to ascertain all of the facts so that
when he goes into court he is fully prepared. The discovery rules have
been responsible for a much more cooperative attitude among attorneys.
In the overwhelming number of cases information is freely and voluntarily
exchanged now where it wasn't earlier, because counsel realize that their
adversary could obtain the information anyway through discovery proceedings.
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There is, however, one additional factor which must be mentioned.
The elimination of complex and unduly technical pleading requirements
and their replacement by the pleading of general averments, entailed to
some extent, the sacrifice of the role played by the old pleadings in
particularizing the issues. Under the federal rules, issue may be joined
with both sides having little or no idea of what issues will eventually be
determinative at the trial. It was hoped that discovery would serve to
take up this slack by clarifying and limiting the issues before trial, but,
unfortunately, we have found that in practice, attorneys seem to get so
involved with the twigs and leaves of little details that they seldom see
the trees, let alone the forest. This accounts for the estimated 90%/ waste
effort in discovery in the "big" cases, that I mentioned earlier.
Fortunately, there is a solution to the abuses of discovery and its failure
on occasions to satisfy the need for confining and clarifying the issues. In
fact, the rules themselves provide the answer. It is the pre-trial conference.
More specifically, it is the pre-trial conference tailored to meet the needs
of the particular case. While the latter may seem an obvious cliche-it
was by no means obvious to most of us for a good long time. And we are
still in the process of studying just what kind of pre-trial conference is best
suited to certain types of cases. It is now generally agreed, after a superb
study compiled by a Committee of the Judicial Conference under the
chairmanship of Judge Prettyman, that in the protracted case, pre-trial
conferences must be extremely extensive and must commence at the inception of the action to impose a tight control on the entire discovery
process. We have also finally come to appreciate, after a good deal of
trial and an equally good deal of error, that pre-trial is not merely the
handmaiden of the "big" case. That although it may require a somewhat
different form in the small case, it is vitally important that counsel in
every case sit down with a judge at some point before trial and discuss
freely what they believe the case to be all about. The pre-trial conference
is not an added frill on the mantle of judicial administration, it is an
absolute essential to the proper functioning of the federal rules. It is not
a job for errand boys or a young clerk fresh out of law school, as some
lawyers seem to think; it is a job requiring the utmost skill and ingenuity
of experienced counsel and experienced judges. The more successful a
judge is in encouraging the lawyers to lay their cards on the table, to reveal
just what their case will consist of, what the defenses will be, etc., the more
successful the conferences are in clarifying and limiting the issues, in
curbing discovery abuses by limiting the scope of discovery and by providing for day-to-day supervision where necessary, in obtaining stipulations
and admissions, in shortening the length of trial and in permitting the
attorneys to re-assess their cases in the light of all this new information.
It is, of course, a truism by now, that once the parties are given a full
picture of the strengths and weaknesses of their own and their adversary's
positions, there is a great likelihood that they will be able to compromise
their disputes amicably without a trial.
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Back in the 1920's, Judge Ira Jayne of Michigan made this startling
discovery when he instituted a pre-trial conference procedure for the first
time in this country to alleviate a congested calendar situation in Detroit.
The validity of his conclusion was recently reaffirmed dramatically in the
Southern District of New York after we made a second important discovery.
We had attempted at one point to utilize the same type of full dress
pre-trial conference for all cases. Instead of encouraging informality and
flexibility our procedures were becoming formal and rigid. We weren't
getting the full benefits of pre-trial; the attorneys were becoming discouraged and disgruntled with what they were coming to consider a waste
of their precious time and as their cooperation began to lag, the procedure
became much more of a waste of time until finally it was necessary to drop
it entirely.
As always, necessity was the mother of our modest discovery. A little
over two years ago our district was confronted with an appalling condition
of calendar congestion and delays. At that time there were 10,334 cases
on our civil docket and approximately 5,000 additional cases were being
added annually. 5,630 cases were awaiting trial on our five civil calendars.
They expected a long wait. There was a three and one-half year waiting
period for jury personal injury actions from the time of filing a note of
issue. Actions on the admiralty calendar had a two year waiting period
and non-jury cases other than personal injury and death actions had a
two and one-half year delay before trial. Even more foreboding, a greater
number of cases were being added to our trial calendars each month than
we were disposing of by trial. Our backlog was growing rather than
diminishing.
Now you gentlemen who have never experienced calendar congestion
may wonder how we ever got into this fix in the first place. Of course, the
backlog was not something that accumulated overnight, it had developed
over a long period of years in which the court did not have the judicial
manpower to cope with its overwhelming volume of litigation. Located
in the greatest financial and industrial center in the world, complicated
commercial litigation and important criminal cases naturally tend to
gravitate to this district. As of June 1956, one-third of all copyright cases,
one-fourth of all government civil anti-trust suits, and about one-fifth of
all private anti-trust suits were on the docket in this district. In addition,
New York being the largest port in the nation, 44% of the admiralty and
maritime litigation in the federal courts is filed in the Southern District
and more than one-half of all Jones Act suits involving injury to seamen.
The statistics of the Administrative Office indicate that the number of
pending civil cases per judgeship in the Southern District of New York is
about twice the national average.
Now before I tell you how we extricated ourselves from this seemingly
insoluble dilemma-let me tell you that we did. In spite of the continuing
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and even expanding volume of litigation in our district, this is our present
situation: We now have fewer cases pending on our trial calendars than at
any time during the past 25 years, with the exception of the war year 1943.
As of the close of the past fiscal year on June 30th, there were only 821
cases on all five of our civil calendars. There are cases being tried where the
accident, mind you, took place less than 6 or 7 months prior to trial. During
the past year it has been possible for litigants to obtain a trial within one
to four months after they signify their readiness for trial. Moreover,
there is every indication that this current status will be maintained in the
future.
It does sound fantastic. But these results were not achieved by brushing up on our alchemy. Here's how it was done.
A careful investigation revealed that the following conditions were
largely responsible for our difficulties. An overwhelming majority of the
cases on our trial calendars were largely unprepared and an equally large
number were cases that would never be tried for varying reasons.
With this "dead wood" represented in our statistics as ready cases
awaiting trial, our calendars were presenting a distorted picture of the
extent of our backlog. Largely because of these misleading statistics, and
the expected delay before trial, attorneys were almost automatically placing
every case upon the trial calendars by filing a note of issue without waiting
until their trial preparations were complete and with little regard being
paid to the possibility or even probability of settlement. This, in turn,
added to the statistical backlog and further encouraged this practice. We
were faced with a classical vicious circle.
Since many cases were settled during trial or on the eve of trial or
were adjourned because of non-readiness, all too frequently judges in the
most congested trial parts were left without any cases ready to be triedand so the backlog grew. Meanwhile cases in which the attorneys were prepared and the litgants were desirous of a trial, were being left waiting for
months and years further down the calendar lists, blocked from reaching
the top by this "dead wood" on the calendar.
We concluded that our primary concern would have to be with
alleviating that condition of the calendars which prevented a reasonably
prompt trial of cases in which litigants were ready and desirous of a trial.
This was adopted as our working definition of calendar congestion.
Statistics indicated that we could not look to more trials alone for a
solution of our problem. Relying solely on more trials would be like
attempting to bail out a rowboat which has a gaping hole in its bottom.
Cases would be added faster than they could possibly be disposed of by
trials.
If we were going to be at all successful, we concluded, it would be
necessary to adopt a different procedure which would afford full justice
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to the litigants. The procedure chosen was the informal pre-trial conference.
On October 3, 1955, calendar control was taken out of the hands of
the calendar commissioner where it had rested for many years and was
placed in the hands of rotating calendar judges. It was hoped that the
judges assigned to the calendar term, called Part I, would be able to weed
out from the trial calendar the "dead wood" of cases which were destined
to be settled or in which trial preparations were far from complete.
Under this new Part I procedure, assignment judges screened every
case pending on our five civil calendars last year-checking on trial preparation, narrowing the issues and discussing settlement. In a nine month
period, 7,229 civil cases were pre-tried by the assignment judges. Largely
as a result of these conferences, a total of 7,162 cases were terminated, i.e.,
closed out and off the dockets, eliminating a backlog representing over
eight years of court time.
The key to our successful "Now you see it, now you don't" performance was our recognition that pre-trial is not just for the big case and
that it need not be the complete and formalized proceeding seemingly
envisioned by the Federal Rules. Instead, pre-trial can be and is a vital,
flexible tool in the hands of the trial judge or court in its daily confrontation of the hundreds and thousands of so-called little or average size cases
which compose the bulk of our calendars.
Of course, pre-trial is no cure-all, and it must be applied with careful
thought and hard work-but properly used, it can work judicial miracles.
I don't believe it necessary to bore you with a lengthy discussion of the
detailed operation of our new procedures. I am confident that the people
of Wyoming will never permit themselves to get into the type of fix that
we found ourselves in.
If there is one lesson that our experience reveals, however, it is that pretrial must never be permitted to become over ritualistic. It operates at its
peak efficiency only when it is adapted to the particular needs of the court
and of the particular case.
Where a large, complex and protracted suit may call for lengthy and
frequent full dress conferences in open court with a reporter taking down
every word, the average negligence action may only require, what Judge
Medina likes to call a "pow wow"-an informal talk in his chambers where
we can visualize him saying to the lawyers "O.K. boys, let's cut out the
nonsense and talk turkey. What's this case all about?"
Whatever kinks there are in the machinery of the federal rules may
be removed by a little pre-trial elbow grease. When the machinery is well
greased, the federal rules are the most effective tools yet discovered for
the attainment of our sole objective-impartial justice, and I congratulate
you again upon your adoption of these rules for it manifests that enlightened approach so necessary in coping with modern day litigation
problems.

